561 lines
42 KiB
HTML
561 lines
42 KiB
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<html lang="en">
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<title>cheri (and morello) | jack bond-preston</title>
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<meta charset="UTF-8">
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<link rel="stylesheet" href="../../style/pygments.css">
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<link rel="icon" type="image/png" href="">
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<div class="article">
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<!-- article body { -->
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<h1 id="title"><a href=".">cheri (and morello)</a></h1>
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<h2 id="premable"><a href="#preamble">preamble</a></h2>
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<p>
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<a href="https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/ctsrd/cheri/">CHERI</a> is an acronym for
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Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions. it is a security-focussed project aimed at
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improving memory protection at the hardware level. the project is complex and it has many potential
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applications.
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</p>
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<p>
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in this article I will go into some basics to give an understanding behind some changes that CHERI
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makes to how programs execute and are written. this will be focussed almost entirely in C, as this
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is where my experience lies - it is also where some of the effects of CHERI are most easily felt.
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this article is going to be a <i>very simplistic</i> introduction to CHERI, and I'm going to
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attempt to explain the basics behind everything I cover. a basic understanding of C will be
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beneficial.
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</p>
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<p>
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<i><b>note:</b></i> <a href="https://www.arm.com/architecture/cpu/morello">the Morello
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platform</a> is an evaluation board produced by <a href="https://www.arm.com/">Arm</a> to provide a
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physical implementation of CHERI extending <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AArch64">the Arm
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AArch64 ISA</a>. I previously worked on this platform at Arm,
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<a href="https://git.morello-project.org/morello/musl-libc/">porting the musl C library to
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Morello</a>. implementations for CHERI that are worth looking into from a more open perspective
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<a href="https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-951.pdf">are the MIPS (chapter 4)
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and RISC-V (chapter 5) ones</a>. Morello is the only implementation that exists in a true hard core
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format, afaik - but this is obviously hard to obtain so you'll just be playing around with
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emulators/models anyway.
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</p>
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<h2 id="memory-safety-bugs"><a href="#memory-safety-bugs">memory safety bugs</a></h2>
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<p>
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to first understand how CHERI tries to fix some simple issues, let's first look at some simplified
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examples of issues that arise when we aren't using a CHERI-based architecture.
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</p>
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<h3>a simple memory safety bug</h3>
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<p>
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let's take a look at this C code:
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</p>
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<div class="highlight"><table class="highlighttable"><tr><td class="linenos"><div class="linenodiv"><pre><span class="normal"> 1</span>
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<span class="normal"> 2</span>
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<span class="normal"> 3</span>
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<span class="normal">11</span>
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<span class="normal">12</span>
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<span class="normal">13</span></pre></div></td><td class="code"><div><pre><span></span><code><span class="cp">#include</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="cpf"><stdio.h></span><span class="cp"></span>
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<span class="kt">int</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="nf">main</span><span class="p">()</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="p">{</span><span class="w"></span>
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<span class="w"> </span><span class="kt">char</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="n">my_perfect_string</span><span class="p">[]</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="o">=</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="s">"what a beautiful string"</span><span class="p">;</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="c1">// so beautiful, I sure hope no-one touches it</span>
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<span class="w"> </span><span class="kt">char</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="n">user_name</span><span class="p">[</span><span class="mi">32</span><span class="p">];</span><span class="w"></span>
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<span class="w"> </span><span class="n">printf</span><span class="p">(</span><span class="s">"enter your name: "</span><span class="p">);</span><span class="w"></span>
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<span class="w"> </span><span class="n">fgets</span><span class="p">(</span><span class="n">user_name</span><span class="p">,</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="mi">1000</span><span class="p">,</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="n">stdin</span><span class="p">);</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="c1">// get user's name from stdin</span>
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<span class="w"> </span><span class="n">printf</span><span class="p">(</span><span class="s">"hello %s"</span><span class="p">,</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="n">user_name</span><span class="p">);</span><span class="w"></span>
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<span class="w"> </span><span class="n">printf</span><span class="p">(</span><span class="s">"my_perfect_string: %s</span><span class="se">\n</span><span class="s">"</span><span class="p">,</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="n">my_perfect_string</span><span class="p">);</span><span class="w"></span>
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<span class="w"> </span><span class="k">return</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="mi">0</span><span class="p">;</span><span class="w"></span>
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<span class="p">}</span><span class="w"></span>
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</code></pre></div></td></tr></table></div>
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<p>
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now let's try using our new program:
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</p>
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<div class="highlight"><table class="highlighttable"><tr><td class="linenos"><div class="linenodiv"><pre><span class="normal">1</span>
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<span class="normal">2</span>
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<span class="normal">3</span>
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<span class="normal">4</span></pre></div></td><td class="code"><div><pre><span></span><code><span class="gp">$ </span>./membug
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<span class="go">enter your name: jack</span>
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<span class="go">hello jack</span>
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<span class="go">my_perfect_string: what a beautiful string</span>
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</code></pre></div></td></tr></table></div>
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<p>
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works on my machine boss! code review +1, and merged... until our good friend
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<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hubert_Blaine_Wolfeschlegelsteinhausenbergerdorff_Sr.">
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Hubert Blaine Wolfeschlegelsteinhausenbergerdorff Sr.</a> comes along. he emails me a strange
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error he's seen:
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</p>
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<div class="highlight"><table class="highlighttable"><tr><td class="linenos"><div class="linenodiv"><pre><span class="normal">1</span>
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<span class="normal">2</span>
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<span class="normal">3</span>
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<span class="normal">4</span></pre></div></td><td class="code"><div><pre><span></span><code><span class="gp">$ </span>./membug
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<span class="go">enter your name: Hubert Blaine Wolfeschlegelsteinhausenbergerdorff Sr.</span>
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<span class="go">hello Hubert Blaine Wolfeschlegelsteinhausenbergerdorff Sr.</span>
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<span class="go">my_perfect_string: hausenbergerdorff Sr.</span>
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</code></pre></div></td></tr></table></div>
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<p>
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that's not supposed to happen! his name has spilled over into our <code>my_perfect_string[]</code>
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array! turns out our issue is that when we use <code>fgets()</code>, we've set the second
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parameter, <code>size</code>, to <code>1000</code> - but our <code>user_name[32]</code> array c1593an
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only fit 32 characters (and the last of these should be a null terminator, so 31 usable characters).
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<code>fgets</code> fills up <code>user_name</code>, but it hasn't finished with the name yet! it
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doesn't care (or know) that <code>user_name</code> is full, it's just going to keep going until it
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finishes our user input, or reads 999 characters from standard input. and thus it keeps mindlessly
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writing, overwriting the memory we've used to store our precious perfect string (which happens to
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be immediately after <code>user_name</code>). let's take a look at the stack in GDB to see why this
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happens:
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</p>
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<div class="highlight"><table class="highlighttable"><tr><td class="linenos"><div class="linenodiv"><pre><span class="normal"> 1</span>
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<span class="normal"> 2</span>
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<span class="normal"> 3</span>
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<span class="normal">16</span></pre></div></td><td class="code"><div><pre><span></span><code><span class="kt">(gdb)</span> <span class="nb">b</span> memdebug.c:<span class="mh">7</span>
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<span class="kt">(gdb)</span> <span class="nb">run</span>
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Breakpoint <span class="mh">1</span>, main () at membug.c:<span class="mh">7</span>
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<span class="mh">7</span> printf(<span class="s">"enter your name: "</span>);
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<span class="kt">(gdb)</span> <span class="nb">n</span>
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<span class="mh">8</span> fgets(user_name, <span class="mh">1000</span>, stdin); // get user's name from stdin
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<span class="kt">(gdb)</span> <span class="nb">n</span>
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<span class="mh">9</span> printf(<span class="s">"hello %s"</span>, user_name);
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<span class="kt">(gdb)</span> <span class="nb">x</span>/<span class="mi">56</span><span class="kc">bc</span> <span class="nv">$sp</span>
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<span class="mh">0x7fffffffdbf0</span>: <span class="mh">106</span> 'j' <span class="mh">97</span> 'a' <span class="mh">99</span> 'c' <span class="mh">107</span> 'k' <span class="mh">10</span> '\n' <span class="mh">0</span> '\<span class="mh">000</span>' <span class="mh">0</span> '\<span class="mh">000</span>' <span class="mh">0</span> '\<span class="mh">000</span>'
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<span class="mh">0x7fffffffdbf8</span>: <span class="mh">77</span> 'M' <span class="mh">82</span> 'R' <span class="mh">85</span> 'U' <span class="mh">85</span> 'U' <span class="mh">85</span> 'U' <span class="mh">85</span> 'U' <span class="mh">0</span> '\<span class="mh">000</span>' <span class="mh">0</span> '\<span class="mh">000</span>'
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<span class="mh">0x7fffffffdc00</span>: -<span class="mh">24</span> '\<span class="mh">350</span>' -<span class="mh">78</span> '\<span class="mh">262</span>' -<span class="mh">5</span> '\<span class="mh">373</span>' -<span class="mh">9</span> '\<span class="mh">367</span>' -<span class="mh">1</span> '\<span class="mh">377</span>' <span class="mh">127</span> '\<span class="mh">177</span>' <span class="mh">0</span> '\<span class="mh">000</span>' <span class="mh">0</span> '\<span class="mh">000</span>'
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<span class="mh">0x7fffffffdc08</span>: <span class="mh">0</span> '\<span class="mh">000</span>' <span class="mh">82</span> 'R' <span class="mh">85</span> 'U' <span class="mh">85</span> 'U' <span class="mh">85</span> 'U' <span class="mh">85</span> 'U' <span class="mh">0</span> '\<span class="mh">000</span>' <span class="mh">0</span> '\<span class="mh">000</span>'
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<span class="mh">0x7fffffffdc10</span>: <span class="mh">119</span> 'w' <span class="mh">104</span> 'h' <span class="mh">97</span> 'a' <span class="mh">116</span> 't' <span class="mh">32</span> ' ' <span class="mh">97</span> 'a' <span class="mh">32</span> ' ' <span class="mh">98</span> 'b'
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<span class="mh">0x7fffffffdc18</span>: <span class="mh">101</span> 'e' <span class="mh">97</span> 'a' <span class="mh">117</span> 'u' <span class="mh">116</span> 't' <span class="mh">105</span> 'i' <span class="mh">102</span> 'f' <span class="mh">117</span> 'u' <span class="mh">108</span> 'l'
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<span class="mh">0x7fffffffdc20</span>: <span class="mh">32</span> ' ' <span class="mh">115</span> 's' <span class="mh">116</span> 't' <span class="mh">114</span> 'r' <span class="mh">105</span> 'i' <span class="mh">110</span> 'n' <span class="mh">103</span> 'g' <span class="mh">0</span> '\<span class="mh">000</span>'
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</code></pre></div></td></tr></table></div>
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<p>
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we can see our two character arrays are right next to each other on the stack
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(<code>user_name</code> contains some gibberish as it is not zero-initialised.
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</p>
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<p>
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<i><b>note:</b></i> this code was compiled with <code>-fno-stack-protector</code> to reproduce this
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behaviour. compilers have certain techniques like this which can help protect against such attacks,
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but there are often ways around these by using less primitive attacks.
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</p>
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<p>
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okay, it's a pretty easy fix, we just need to change the <code>fgets(char *s, int size, FILE *stream)</code>
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parameter <code>size</code> to <code>32</code>.
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</p>
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<p>
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<i><b>note:</b></i> you may initially think "why not 31? don't we need to save a character for
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the null byte at the end?". thankfully, <code>fgets</code> does this for us. excerpt from <code>man
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fgets</code>: "fgets() reads in <i>at most one less than size</i> characters from stream and stores
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them into the buffer pointed to by s [...] A terminating null byte ('\0') is stored after the last
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character in the buffer". this is a good question to be asking though, being careful is key when it
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comes to these kinds of things.
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</p>
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<h3>why hardware?</h3>
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<p>
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okay, so that's an easy fix. why are we talking about doing anything in hardware here? just write
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the code correctly! the issue is code gets very complex, and this is a very simplistic situation.
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some memory safety bugs can be incredibly complicated and go unnoticed for decades. the C language
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especially gives the programmer many, many opportunities to make mistakes - and it only takes one
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to be a problem. a lot of the software we are using these days is based on stacks upon stacks of
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software written in different languages, and there are going to be bugs in there. CHERI should
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give us some protection "for free" (it's not this simple, in actuality).
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</p>
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<p>
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some languages (e.g. Rust) are going to offer you strong memory safety guarantees
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at compile-time, but that's not the topic of this article. the differences between doing this
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kind of protection in software or hardware (or both) is more complex than the scope of this
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article. in addition, CHERI's benefits are more wide in breadth than just protecting against this
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kind of issue.
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</p>
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<h2 id="pointers-recap"><a href="#pointers-recap">pointers recap</a></h2>
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<p>
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let's quickly recap a basic idea of what a pointer is. we're going to ignore things like
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<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_memory">virtual memory</a> for brevity. we can think
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of a pointer in a normal 64-bit architecture (e.g. AArch64) simply as a 64-bit unsigned value that
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holds the memory address of something we care about. this is a simplification (as are most things),
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but it can help us reason about the general idea:
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</p>
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<div class="highlight"><table class="highlighttable"><tr><td class="linenos"><div class="linenodiv"><pre><span class="normal">1</span>
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<span class="normal">2</span></pre></div></td><td class="code"><div><pre><span></span><code><span class="kt">int</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="n">val</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="o">=</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="mi">1593</span><span class="p">;</span><span class="w"></span>
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<span class="kt">int</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="o">*</span><span class="n">x</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="o">=</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="o">&</span><span class="n">val</span><span class="p">;</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="c1">// x points to val</span>
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</code></pre></div></td></tr></table></div>
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<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 1920 314"><defs><style>.prefix__c{stroke-linecap:square;stroke-width:3px}.prefix__c,.prefix__d{fill:none;stroke-miterlimit:10}.prefix__c{stroke:#fcfcfc}.prefix__f,.prefix__h,.prefix__i{font-size:24px}.prefix__f,.prefix__h,.prefix__k{fill:#fcfcfc}.prefix__f,.prefix__l{font-family:TeXGyreCursor}.prefix__d{stroke:gray;stroke-width:4px}.prefix__h,.prefix__m{font-family:TeXGyreCursor;font-weight:bold;}.prefix__i,.prefix__n{fill:gray}</style></defs><g id="prefix__a"><path fill="#0c1114" d="M0 0h1920v314H0z"/><text class="prefix__h" transform="translate(577.46 133.41)"><tspan x="0" y="0">int *x</tspan></text><text class="prefix__f" transform="translate(490.97 177.1)"><tspan x="0" y="0">0x0000010000000004</tspan></text><path class="prefix__c" d="M481.16 206v18.5M760.5 206v18.5M481.5 224.5h279"/><text transform="translate(578.78 241.33)" font-size="20" font-family="TeXGyreCursor" fill="#fcfcfc"><tspan x="0" y="0">address</tspan></text><path stroke-width="4" stroke="#fcfcfc" fill="none" stroke-miterlimit="10" d="M752 171h204.56"/><path class="prefix__k" d="M948.64 182.62L992 171.01l-43.36-11.63v23.24z"/><text transform="translate(1272.76 177.16)" fill="#fcfcfc" font-size="24"><tspan class="prefix__m" x="0" y="0">mem[</tspan><tspan class="prefix__l" x="57.6" y="0">0x0000010000000004</tspan><tspan class="prefix__m" x="316.79" y="0">]</tspan></text><text class="prefix__i" transform="translate(1272.76 133.16)"><tspan class="prefix__m" x="0" y="0">mem[</tspan><tspan class="prefix__l" x="57.6" y="0">0x0000010000000000</tspan><tspan class="prefix__m" x="316.79" y="0">]</tspan></text><text class="prefix__i" transform="translate(1271.76 224.16)"><tspan class="prefix__m" x="0" y="0">mem[</tspan><tspan class="prefix__l" x="57.6" y="0">0x0000010000000008</tspan><tspan class="prefix__m" x="316.79" y="0">]</tspan></text></g><g id="prefix__b"><path class="prefix__d" d="M1260 58v48H985V58"/><path class="prefix__n" d="M1258 195v40H987v-40h271m4-4H983v48h279v-48zM1258 107v40H987v-40h271m4-4H983v48h279v-48z"/><path class="prefix__k" d="M756.16 150.93v40h-271v-40h271m4-4h-279v48h279v-48zM1258 151v40H987v-40h271m4-4H983v48h279v-48z"/><text class="prefix__f" transform="translate(1094 177.09)"><tspan x="0" y="0">1593</tspan></text><text class="prefix__h" transform="translate(1007.6 45.16)"><tspan x="0" y="0">memory (as ints)</tspan></text><path class="prefix__d" d="M1260 284v-48H985v48"/></g></svg>
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
<p>
|
||
|
|
and on these normal architectures, this pointer generally is just a number. we can do weird things
|
||
|
|
with it, treating it as a number...
|
||
|
|
</p>
|
||
|
|
<div class="highlight"><table class="highlighttable"><tr><td class="linenos"><div class="linenodiv"><pre><span class="normal"> 1</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal"> 2</span>
|
||
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<span class="normal"> 3</span>
|
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<span class="normal"> 4</span>
|
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<span class="normal"> 5</span>
|
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<span class="normal"> 7</span>
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<span class="normal"> 8</span>
|
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<span class="normal"> 9</span>
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<span class="normal">10</span>
|
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<span class="normal">11</span>
|
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<span class="normal">12</span>
|
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<span class="normal">13</span>
|
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<span class="normal">14</span>
|
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<span class="normal">15</span>
|
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<span class="normal">16</span>
|
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<span class="normal">17</span>
|
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<span class="normal">18</span>
|
||
|
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<span class="normal">19</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal">20</span></pre></div></td><td class="code"><div><pre><span></span><code><span class="cp">#include</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="cpf"><stdio.h></span><span class="cp"></span>
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
<span class="kt">int</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="nf">main</span><span class="p">()</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="p">{</span><span class="w"></span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="w"> </span><span class="kt">int</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="n">magic</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="o">=</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="mi">9999</span><span class="p">;</span><span class="w"></span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="w"> </span><span class="kt">int</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="n">arr</span><span class="p">[]</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="o">=</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="p">{</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="mi">1234</span><span class="p">,</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="mi">5678</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="p">};</span><span class="w"></span>
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
<span class="w"> </span><span class="kt">int</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="o">*</span><span class="n">x</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="o">=</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="o">&</span><span class="p">(</span><span class="n">arr</span><span class="p">[</span><span class="mi">0</span><span class="p">]);</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="c1">// x is a pointer to first element of arr</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="w"> </span><span class="n">printf</span><span class="p">(</span><span class="s">"*x=%d</span><span class="se">\n</span><span class="s">"</span><span class="p">,</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="o">*</span><span class="n">x</span><span class="p">);</span><span class="w"></span>
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
<span class="w"> </span><span class="kt">unsigned</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="kt">long</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="n">x_addr</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="o">=</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="p">(</span><span class="kt">size_t</span><span class="p">)</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="n">x</span><span class="p">;</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="c1">// we're going to assume size_t = unsigned long here</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="w"> </span><span class="n">x_addr</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="o">+=</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="mi">4</span><span class="p">;</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="c1">// sizeof(int) == 4</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="w"> </span><span class="n">x</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="o">=</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="p">(</span><span class="kt">int</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="o">*</span><span class="p">)</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="n">x_addr</span><span class="p">;</span><span class="w"></span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="w"> </span><span class="n">printf</span><span class="p">(</span><span class="s">"*x=%d</span><span class="se">\n</span><span class="s">"</span><span class="p">,</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="o">*</span><span class="n">x</span><span class="p">);</span><span class="w"></span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="w"> </span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="w"> </span><span class="n">x_addr</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="o">+=</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="mi">4</span><span class="p">;</span><span class="w"></span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="w"> </span><span class="n">x</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="o">=</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="p">(</span><span class="kt">int</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="o">*</span><span class="p">)</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="n">x_addr</span><span class="p">;</span><span class="w"></span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="w"> </span><span class="n">printf</span><span class="p">(</span><span class="s">"*x=%d</span><span class="se">\n</span><span class="s">"</span><span class="p">,</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="o">*</span><span class="n">x</span><span class="p">);</span><span class="w"></span>
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
<span class="w"> </span><span class="k">return</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="mi">0</span><span class="p">;</span><span class="w"></span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="p">}</span><span class="w"></span>
|
||
|
|
</code></pre></div></td></tr></table></div>
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
<p>...and this code will often still work:</p>
|
||
|
|
<div class="highlight"><table class="highlighttable"><tr><td class="linenos"><div class="linenodiv"><pre><span class="normal">1</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal">2</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal">3</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal">4</span></pre></div></td><td class="code"><div><pre><span></span><code><span class="gp">$ </span>./ptrs_as_numbers
|
||
|
|
<span class="go">*x=1234</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="go">*x=5678</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="go">*x=9999</span>
|
||
|
|
</code></pre></div></td></tr></table></div>
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
<p>
|
||
|
|
yikes! now, when you start messing with pointers like this, you're bound to run into a bunch of
|
||
|
|
undefined behaviour. but C programmers write undefined behaviour all the time, and my computer
|
||
|
|
executes this program fine without complaining at all. doesn't it feel a bit weird that we can take
|
||
|
|
a pointer to <code>arr[0]</code> and modify it to load <code>secret</code>? they're not even part
|
||
|
|
of the same array...
|
||
|
|
</p>
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
<h2 id="introducting-capabilities"><a href="#introducting-capabilities">introducting capabilities</a></h2>
|
||
|
|
<p>
|
||
|
|
CHERI introduces capabilities, which can be thought of as an extension to pointers. they still
|
||
|
|
store an address of something we care about, but they have extra information too! in a 64-bit
|
||
|
|
system, a pointer would typically be a 64-bit value (as dicussed previously). the corresponding
|
||
|
|
capability in a CHERI platform is 128 bits (or 129 bits if you look at it a certain way, more about
|
||
|
|
that later...).
|
||
|
|
</p>
|
||
|
|
<p>
|
||
|
|
as you might have guessed, this "extra information" takes up 64 bits of the capability. bits are
|
||
|
|
assigned to three key pieces of metadata: <i>bounds</i>, <i>permissions</i>, and
|
||
|
|
<i>object type</i>. there is also an additional 1-bit <i>tag</i> which is stored out-of-band: it is
|
||
|
|
not a 129-bit value - instead each 128-bit capability can be thought of as being associated with a
|
||
|
|
1-bit validity tag. the architecture manages this. the diagram below is provided as a rough
|
||
|
|
overview of this. note that it is not to scale.
|
||
|
|
</p>
|
||
|
|
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 1920 314"><defs><style>.prefix__c{fill:none;stroke:#fcfcfc;stroke-linecap:square;stroke-miterlimit:10;stroke-width:3px}.prefix__f,.prefix__g{fill:#fcfcfc}.prefix__f{font-family:TeXGyreCursor;font-size:20px}</style></defs><g id="prefix__a"><path fill="#0c1114" d="M0 0h1920v314H0z"/><text transform="translate(101.86 232.41)" font-family="TeXGyreCursor" font-weight="700" fill="#fcfcfc" font-size="24"><tspan x="0" y="0">int *x (capability)</tspan></text><text transform="translate(1205.97 232.1)" font-family="TeXGyreCursor" fill="#fcfcfc" font-size="24"><tspan x="0" y="0">0x0000010000000004</tspan></text><path class="prefix__c" d="M1016 261v18.5M1656 261v18.5M1016 279.5h640"/><text class="prefix__f" transform="translate(1293.78 296.33)"><tspan x="0" y="0">address</tspan></text><path class="prefix__c" d="M700 191.5V173M1020 191.5V173M700 173h320"/><text class="prefix__f" transform="translate(823.78 167.74)"><tspan x="0" y="0">bounds</tspan></text><path class="prefix__c" d="M554 260.34v18.5M704 260.34v18.5M554 278.84h150"/><text class="prefix__f" transform="translate(562.78 295.68)"><tspan x="0" y="0">object type</tspan></text><g><path class="prefix__c" d="M391.89 191.56v-18.5M541.89 191.56v-18.5M391.89 173.06h150"/></g><text class="prefix__f" transform="translate(400.67 167.8)"><tspan x="0" y="0">permissions</tspan></text><text class="prefix__f" transform="translate(304.67 31.07)"><tspan x="0" y="0">tag (out-of-band)</tspan></text><g><path class="prefix__c" d="M391.33 55.92v-18.5M421.33 55.92v-18.5M391.33 37.42h30"/></g></g><g id="prefix__b"><path class="prefix__g" d="M1651.66 205.93v40h-632v-40h632m4-4h-640v48h640v-48z"/><path class="prefix__g" d="M1016 206v40H704v-40h312m4-4H700v48h320v-48z"/><path class="prefix__g" d="M700 206v40H558v-40h142m4-4H554v48h150v-48z"/><path class="prefix__g" d="M554 206v40h-12v-40h12m4-4h-20v48h20v-48z"/><path class="prefix__g" d="M538 206v40H396v-40h142m4-4H392v48h150v-48zM418.5 70v40h-22V70h22m4-4h-30v48h30V66z"/></g></svg>
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
<p>
|
||
|
|
I am mostly going to focus on <i>bounds</i> in this article, as it is not too difficult to grasp,
|
||
|
|
and the impact is fairly easy to demonstrate for some simple examples. the bounds represent an
|
||
|
|
upper and lower bound on the memory region (address space) that this capability is allowed to
|
||
|
|
access. if we try to use the capability to access some address outside of this range, the hardware
|
||
|
|
will throw a fault - it simply won't let us do this!
|
||
|
|
</p>
|
||
|
|
<p>
|
||
|
|
<b><i>note:</i></b> it is important to note that I am going to oversimplify the way the bounds are
|
||
|
|
stored in this article. this especially includes the diagram above. in reality, there is a complex
|
||
|
|
compression method, necessitated by the range and sizes required by bounds. this depends on the
|
||
|
|
address value, alignment, etc. for now, we shouldn't need to think about this much, just know it
|
||
|
|
will be managed for us. the key take-away from this is that <i>bounds can't always be 100% precise
|
||
|
|
for all addresses and ranges</i>.
|
||
|
|
</p>
|
||
|
|
<p>
|
||
|
|
can you imagine how we can use bounds to prevent our previous memory safety bug from occurring? the
|
||
|
|
key is that we can set the bounds on the capability pointing to <code>user_name</code> which we
|
||
|
|
pass to <code>fgets</code>, such that the capability may only access the contents of the array.
|
||
|
|
this means that when <code>fgets</code> tries to write past the end of the <code>user_name</code>
|
||
|
|
array, the processor will throw a <i>capability fault</i>, and execution of our program will cease.
|
||
|
|
</p>
|
||
|
|
<p>
|
||
|
|
the idea behind CHERI is that we don't have to set up these bounds ourselves. this is something the
|
||
|
|
compiler can generate code for. the compiler knows that the <code>user_name</code> array has a
|
||
|
|
length of <code>32</code>, and can set the bounds accordingly on capabilities created that point to
|
||
|
|
it. let's try it...
|
||
|
|
</p>
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
<h2 id="playing-with-cheri"><a href="#playing-with-cheri">playing with CHERI RISC-V</a></h2>
|
||
|
|
<p>
|
||
|
|
unless you're lucky enough to have access to a physical Morello board, there is the issue of
|
||
|
|
actually using a CHERI implementation. for this article I will be making use of the
|
||
|
|
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QEMU">QEMU</a> emulator to emulate a
|
||
|
|
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RISC-V">RISC-V</a> CHERI environment. running
|
||
|
|
<a href="https://www.cheribsd.org/">CheriBSD</a> on this emulator will allow us to have a nice
|
||
|
|
<a href="https://www.freebsd.org/">FreeBSD</a>-based capability-enabled environment to play around
|
||
|
|
with. I'll use <a href="https://github.com/CTSRD-CHERI/cheribuild">cheribuild</a> to easily get set
|
||
|
|
up:
|
||
|
|
</p>
|
||
|
|
<div class="highlight"><table class="highlighttable"><tr><td class="linenos"><div class="linenodiv"><pre><span class="normal"> 1</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal"> 2</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal"> 3</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal"> 4</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal"> 5</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal"> 6</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal"> 7</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal"> 8</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal"> 9</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal">10</span></pre></div></td><td class="code"><div><pre><span></span><code><span class="gp">$ </span>sudo apt install autoconf automake libtool pkg-config clang bison cmake <span class="se">\</span>
|
||
|
|
ninja-build samba flex texinfo <span class="nb">time</span> libglib2.0-dev libpixman-1-dev <span class="se">\</span>
|
||
|
|
libarchive-dev libarchive-tools libbz2-dev libattr1-dev libcap-ng-dev
|
||
|
|
<span class="gp">$ </span>git clone git@github.com:CTSRD-CHERI/cheribuild
|
||
|
|
<span class="gp">$ </span><span class="nb">cd</span> cheribuild
|
||
|
|
<span class="gp">$ </span>./cheribuild.py --include-dependencies --run/ssh-forwarding-port <span class="m">2222</span> run-riscv64-purecap
|
||
|
|
<span class="go">CheriBSD/riscv (cheribsd-riscv64-purecap) (ttyu0)</span>
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
<span class="go">login: root</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="gp">root@cheribsd-riscv64-purecap:~ #</span>
|
||
|
|
</code></pre></div></td></tr></table></div>
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
<p>
|
||
|
|
now we have our shell inside our CheriBSD emulated platform, we can start to try things out. let's
|
||
|
|
compile our <code>membug</code> program again, this time with the toolchain targetting
|
||
|
|
CheriBSD RISC-V - this will have been built as part of the dependencies already. once it's built,
|
||
|
|
we can <code>scp</code> it over to the CheriBSD filesystem, as we set up the SSH forwarding port to
|
||
|
|
<code>1111</code>.
|
||
|
|
</p>
|
||
|
|
<div class="highlight"><table class="highlighttable"><tr><td class="linenos"><div class="linenodiv"><pre><span class="normal">1</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal">2</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal">3</span></pre></div></td><td class="code"><div><pre><span></span><code><span class="gp"># </span>on a separate terminal on your host machine
|
||
|
|
<span class="gp">$ </span>~/cheri/output/sdk/utils/cheribsd-riscv64-purecap-clang membug.c -Wall -g -fno-stack-protector -o membug-cheribsd
|
||
|
|
<span class="gp">$ </span>scp -P <span class="m">2222</span> ./membug-cheribsd root@localhost:~/
|
||
|
|
</code></pre></div></td></tr></table></div>
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
<p>
|
||
|
|
and now we can see what happens when we explore our bug with CHERI:
|
||
|
|
</p>
|
||
|
|
<div class="highlight"><table class="highlighttable"><tr><td class="linenos"><div class="linenodiv"><pre><span class="normal">1</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal">2</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal">3</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal">4</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal">5</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal">6</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal">7</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal">8</span></pre></div></td><td class="code"><div><pre><span></span><code><span class="gp">$</span>./membug-cheribsd
|
||
|
|
<span class="go">enter your name: jack</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="go">hello jack</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="go">my_perfect_string: what a beautiful string</span>
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
<span class="gp">$ </span>./membug-cheribsd
|
||
|
|
<span class="go">enter your name: Hubert Blaine Wolfeschlegelsteinhausenbergerdorff Sr.</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="go">In-address space security exception (core dumped)</span>
|
||
|
|
</code></pre></div></td></tr></table></div>
|
||
|
|
<p>
|
||
|
|
it's working! we are getting a capability fault as we exceed the bounds of the
|
||
|
|
<code>user_name</code> capability bounds. we can use gdb to verify this is
|
||
|
|
caused by the bounds fault:
|
||
|
|
</p>
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
<div class="highlight"><table class="highlighttable"><tr><td class="linenos"><div class="linenodiv"><pre><span class="normal">1</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal">2</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal">3</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal">4</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal">5</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal">6</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal">7</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal">8</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal">9</span></pre></div></td><td class="code"><div><pre><span></span><code><span class="kt">(gdb)</span> <span class="nb">run</span>
|
||
|
|
Starting program: /root/membug-cheribsd
|
||
|
|
enter your name: Hubert Blaine Wolfeschlegelsteinhausenbergerdorff Sr.
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
Program received signal SIGPROT, CHERI protection violation.
|
||
|
|
Capability bounds fault caused by register ca<span class="mh">6</span>.
|
||
|
|
<span class="mh">0x0000000040314ce8</span> in memcpy (dst<span class="mh">0</span><span class="o">=</span><span class="mh">0x3fffdfff44</span>, src<span class="mh">0</span><span class="o">=</span><optimized out>, length<span class="o">=</span><span class="mh">54</span>) at /home/jack/cheri/cheribsd/lib/libc/string/bcopy.c:<span class="mh">143</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="kt">(gdb)</span> <span class="nb">p</span> <span class="nv">$ca6</span>
|
||
|
|
$<span class="mh">1</span> <span class="o">=</span> () <span class="mh">0x3fffdfff78</span> [rwRW,<span class="mh">0x3fffdfff44</span>-<span class="mh">0x3fffdfff64</span>]
|
||
|
|
</code></pre></div></td></tr></table></div>
|
||
|
|
<p>
|
||
|
|
as we can see, the bounds for our <code>user_name</code> capability (which is stored in capability
|
||
|
|
register <code>ca6</code>) are <code>0x3fffdfff44-0x3fffdfff64</code>, but the address is
|
||
|
|
<code>0x3fffdfff78</code>. this is out of the bounds allowed by the capability, so the architecture
|
||
|
|
throws a fault. if we look at the assembly generated by the compiler, we can see it set our
|
||
|
|
capability bounds to a size of 32 to enforce this behaviour:
|
||
|
|
</p>
|
||
|
|
<div class="highlight"><table class="highlighttable"><tr><td class="linenos"><div class="linenodiv"><pre><span class="normal"> 1</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal"> 2</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal"> 3</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal"> 4</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal"> 5</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal"> 6</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal"> 7</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal"> 8</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal"> 9</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal">10</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal">11</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal">12</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal">13</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal">14</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal">15</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal">16</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal">17</span></pre></div></td><td class="code"><div><pre><span></span><code><span class="mh">0000000000001ce8</span><span class="w"> </span><span class="p"><</span><span class="nf">main</span><span class="p">>:</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="x">; int main() {</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="x"> 1ce8: 5b 11 01 f6 cincoffset csp, csp, -160</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="x"> 1cec: 23 48 11 08 csc cra, 144(csp)</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="x"> 1cf0: 23 40 81 08 csc cs0, 128(csp)</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="x"> 1cf4: 5b 14 01 0a cincoffset cs0, csp, 160</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="x"> 1cf8: 5b 15 c4 fd cincoffset ca0, cs0, -36</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="x"> 1cfc: 5b 26 45 00 csetbounds ca2, ca0, 4</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="x"> 1d00: 5b 15 44 fc cincoffset ca0, cs0, -60</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="x"> 1d04: 5b 25 85 01 csetbounds ca0, ca0, 24</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="x"> 1d08: 23 40 a4 f8 csc ca0, -128(cs0)</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="x"> 1d0c: db 15 44 fa cincoffset ca1, cs0, -92</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="hll"><span class="x"> 1d10: db a5 05 02 csetbounds ca1, ca1, 32</span>
|
||
|
|
</span><span class="x"> 1d14: 23 48 b4 f6 csc ca1, -144(cs0)</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="x"> 1d18: 81 45 mv a1, zero</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="x"> 1d1a: 23 3c b4 f8 csd a1, -104(cs0)</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="x"> 1d1e: 23 20 b6 00 csw a1, 0(ca2)</span>
|
||
|
|
</code></pre></div></td></tr></table></div>
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
<h3>capability monotonicity</h2>
|
||
|
|
<p>
|
||
|
|
at this point you may be thinking "okay, that's great, but if we can just set
|
||
|
|
the bounds of a capability with an instruction then what's the point? surely
|
||
|
|
I can just set global bounds on some random pointer and access whatever I want?"
|
||
|
|
</p>
|
||
|
|
<p>
|
||
|
|
fundamental to the idea of capabilities is their <i>provenance</i> and
|
||
|
|
<i>monotonicity</i>. simply put, the first says we can only construct a
|
||
|
|
capability using specific instructions, from an existing capability. we can't
|
||
|
|
just create a capability from some random number. let's see what happens when
|
||
|
|
we try to run our <code>ptrs_as_numbers</code> program on CheriBSD:
|
||
|
|
</p>
|
||
|
|
<div class="highlight"><table class="highlighttable"><tr><td class="linenos"><div class="linenodiv"><pre><span class="normal"> 1</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal"> 2</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal"> 3</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal"> 4</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal"> 5</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal"> 6</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal"> 7</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal"> 8</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal"> 9</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="normal">10</span></pre></div></td><td class="code"><div><pre><span></span><code><span class="kt">(gdb)</span> <span class="nb">run</span>
|
||
|
|
Starting program: /root/ptrs_as_numbers-cheribsd
|
||
|
|
*x<span class="o">=</span><span class="mh">1234</span>
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
Program received signal SIGPROT, CHERI protection violation.
|
||
|
|
Capability tag fault caused by register ca<span class="mh">1</span>.
|
||
|
|
<span class="mh">0x0000000000101c66</span> in main () at ptrs_as_numbers.c:<span class="mh">14</span>
|
||
|
|
<span class="mh">14</span> printf(<span class="s">"*x=%d\n"</span>, *x);
|
||
|
|
<span class="kt">(gdb)</span> <span class="nb">p</span> <span class="nv">$ca1</span>
|
||
|
|
$<span class="mh">1</span> <span class="o">=</span> () <span class="mh">0x3fffdfff74</span>
|
||
|
|
</code></pre></div></td></tr></table></div>
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
<p>
|
||
|
|
we can see we get a fault - the tag isn't set. any capability with a tag not
|
||
|
|
set to 1 cannot be dereferenced - it is invalid. in fact, this capability has
|
||
|
|
no capability metadata - when we copied it into our <code>unsigned long</code>,
|
||
|
|
we just copied the 64-bit address.
|
||
|
|
</p>
|
||
|
|
<p>
|
||
|
|
<i>monotonicity</i> is what stops us taking an existing capability, and
|
||
|
|
creating a capability with more permissions and/or access than the original. it
|
||
|
|
stipulates that when we create a capability from another capability (which we
|
||
|
|
have to do - provenance), the permissions and bounds of the new capability must
|
||
|
|
be equal to or less than the original. so our bounds can only get narrower as
|
||
|
|
we create new capabilites from an existing capability. this means that
|
||
|
|
capabilities trace back in a chain - they are all created from other
|
||
|
|
capabilities, and narrowed as necessary. in this case, (simplified) when the
|
||
|
|
kernel loads our program it will give us capabilities that are wide enough to
|
||
|
|
do everything we need to do, and the compiler will try and make sure all the
|
||
|
|
capabilities that we make and use from these are as tightly bound and
|
||
|
|
unpermissive as possible.
|
||
|
|
</p>
|
||
|
|
<h3>CHERI-fying code</h3>
|
||
|
|
<p>
|
||
|
|
you'll notice we got a lot of these benefits "for free". we only had to
|
||
|
|
recompile our code, and we got this extra security. of course, CHERI does
|
||
|
|
require changes to programs. naturally, the compiler had to be changed a lot to
|
||
|
|
implement this behaviour. it also especially requires changes to things like
|
||
|
|
the C library and kernel in order to take advantage of the features fully.
|
||
|
|
sufficiently large userspace programs do need changes too. one common issue is
|
||
|
|
that a lot of existing C code assumes that
|
||
|
|
<code>sizeof (*void) == sizeof(size_t)</code>. with CHERI, our pointers are
|
||
|
|
now twice as big. however, <code>size_t</code> hasn't changed size, as the
|
||
|
|
address space size hasn't changed - for example, if we index into an array with
|
||
|
|
<code>size_t</code>, the index should still be the same size; the extra data in
|
||
|
|
our <code>void *</code> capability is the metadata, not extra address data. any
|
||
|
|
program that tries to convert from some <code>unsigned long</code> or
|
||
|
|
<code>size_t</code> to a capability will fault - this violates provenance. so,
|
||
|
|
sometimes code changes have to be made to ensure we are keeping the capability
|
||
|
|
metadata around.
|
||
|
|
</p>
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
<h2 id="epilogue"><a href="#epilogue">epilogue</a></h2>
|
||
|
|
<p>
|
||
|
|
I appreciate this has been a fragmented and surface level introduction to
|
||
|
|
CHERI. hopefully it has provided some education in some basic aims of CHERI
|
||
|
|
regardless. potential benefits and uses for CHERI go much deeper than anything
|
||
|
|
I've touched on here, so please, read more about everything - and get your
|
||
|
|
hands dirty trying out messing about with qemu and CheriBSD!
|
||
|
|
</p>
|
||
|
|
<p>
|
||
|
|
here are some links to check out:
|
||
|
|
<ul>
|
||
|
|
<li><a href="https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/ctsrd/cheri/">CHERI homepage @ CUCL</a></li>
|
||
|
|
<li><a href="https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-941.pdf">technical report: An Introduction to CHERI</a></li>
|
||
|
|
<li><a href="https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-947.pdf">technical report: CHERI C/C++ Programming Guide</a></li>
|
||
|
|
<li><a href="https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-951.pdf">technical report: CHERI ISAv8</a></li>
|
||
|
|
<li><a href="https://www.arm.com/architecture/cpu/morello">Morello homepage @ Arm</a></li>
|
||
|
|
<li><a href="https://developer.arm.com/documentation/ddi0606/latest">Morello Architecture Reference Manual @ Arm</a></li>
|
||
|
|
</ul>
|
||
|
|
</p>
|
||
|
|
</div>
|
||
|
|
</body>
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
</html>
|